Parshas Vayikra

Vayikra

 

Understanding Animal Sacrifices

A major tenet in Jewish theology is that purity of intent is not a prerequisite to the fulfillment of mitzvos. Our Rabbis teach that lackluster mitzvah performance is not to be underestimated for it may eventually lead to higher quality service, “for doing good with an ulterior motive will lead to doing good for its own sake (Pesachim 50b).” A notable exception to this rule is the offering of sacrifices. When offering a sacrifice, one must bring it “lishma”, with the requisite intent, or else it is not valid. Parenthetically, this patently refutes the claim of the ancient idolaters that the purpose of animal sacrifice was to assuage the rage of an intolerant, bloodthirsty deity. If this would be the case, why would lack of intent be detrimental to the efficacy of an offering, for as long as the blood was spilled Hashem should be satisfied. The questions that we must raise are, what is the benefit of animal sacrifice upon human growth and catharsis and why the unusual stress on premium intent?

The Ramban offers the following insight. “Man’s deeds are accomplished through thought, speech, and action. Therefore, G-d commanded that when man sins and brings an offering, he should place his hands upon it corresponding to the evil deed he committed with his hands. He should further confess his sins orally in contrast to the evil deed he articulated, and he should burn the innards and the kidneys of the offering as they are instruments of thought and desire in the human being. He should sprinkle the blood upon the altar which is analogous to the blood of the human body. All these acts are performed in order that a person should realize that he has sinned against G-d with his body and soul. By right, his blood should really be spilled and his body burnt. However, due to the loving-kindness of the Creator, a substitute is taken instead with its blood in place of his blood, its life in place of his life and major limbs of the offering in place of the major limbs of his body.” From the Ramban we learn that a korban is a vicarious experience - animal in lieu of man. Therefore, the necessity of proper intent is paramount as it assures a meaningful and effective teshuva process.

With this we can understand a difficult phrase in Selichos. “He who answered our father, Avraham, on Mount Moriah, may He answer us.” Where do we find a supplication emanating from Avraham at the Akeida to spare his son from slaughter? To the contrary, Avraham was so bent on slaughtering Yitzchak that even after Avraham was commanded to desist, he asked if he could at least inflict a small wound and withdraw a bit of blood (Rashi). The answer lies in the following. The posuk says that Avraham took the ram and offered it, “instead of his son.” Rashi explains that at every major point of service on the ram, Avraham had in mind that it should be in lieu of his son. Once Avraham was successful in offering the first vicarious korban (the ram in lieu of Yitzchak), he turned to Hashem and made the following request, “And Avraham called the name of that place “Hashem will see.”” Avraham prayed that on this very mountain the Almighty would accept the future sacrifices of the Jewish people. The Akeida created the precedent for the efficacy of vicarious animal sacrifice. By virtue of Avraham’s ability to bring the ram, “in lieu of his son,” the Jewish People forever can offer meaningful korbanos on Har Hamoriah.


Inspiring Thoughts on Maos Chitim
Our Shul’s annual Maos Chitim drive will take place this Shabbos. In order to encourage everyone to participate in this beautiful mitzvah. allow me to share with you a number of concepts concerning Maos Chitim.


1) The Rama (O.C. 429) tells us, “It is customary to purchase grain and distribute it to the indigent for their Pesach needs.” The commentaries grapple with the Rama’s description of Maos Chitim as a custom, when in actuality the Yerushalmi in Baba Basra tells us that it is an obligation. The Mishna Berurah suggests (Shar Hatziun 7) that one may fulfill the obligation of Maos Chitim by distributing money to the indigent. The custom, however, is to give the poor the actual grain or flour with which to bake the matzos. There are a number of reasons for the custom of giving the actual grain.


I. A gift of grain is deemed more ideal than money since the needy individual can more readily benefit from the gift, as opposed to first purchasing the grain and subsequently baking the matzos. (Matzos were not available commercially in those days.) Support for this concept can be found in the Gemorah in Taanis 23b. The Gemorah relates that during a severe drought, both Aba Chilkiya and his wife prayed for rain. In response to their pleas, clouds developed over her corner and produced rain. As a housewife, she gave tzedaka by sharing actual gifts of food with the poor, in contrast to her husband’s allocation of money alone.


II. Due to the tendency of money to devaluate, the concern was that the same amount of money would be allocated annually, failing to satisfy the basic needs of the poor. The custom of allocating actual grain, reminded people that the gift had to translate itself into a sufficient number of matzos, based on yearly market value.


III. The Lekutai Maarich says that the custom of Maos Chitim is based on the comment of the Zohar Chadash in Bereishis that tells us, “That which the Mishna teaches, we are judged on Pesach concerning grain, is contingent upon how much grain was shared with the poor the previous year.” We therefore distribute actual grain in order that the blessing should fall on the new crop of wheat.


2) The Achronim explain that the obligation of Maos Chitim stems not only from the mitzvah of tzedaka but is also part and parcel of the fulfillment of the mitzvah of “Simchas Yom Tov.” The Rambam writes (Hilchos Yom Tov 6,18), “when one eats and drinks, one is obligated to feed those less fortunate i.e. the stranger, orphan, widow, and poor. One who locks his door and eats and drinks only with his family, neglecting the poor and those of bitter fortune, do not experience Simcha shel Mitzvah but rather a hedonistic orgy!” Through sharing Maos Chitim with others, we fulfill our personal obligation of Simchas Yom Tov. With this we can understand why the halacha of Maos Chitim was placed in the laws of Pesach as opposed to the laws of tzedaka. There is also a practical halachic difference if the obligation of Maos Chitim is also a mitzvah of Simchas Yom Tov. The mitzvah of tzedaka is only an obligation when one has enough for his own livelihood. However, the mitzva of Simchas Yom Tov demands that one borrow money to fulfill the obligation of simcha. Therefore, one who doesn’t have enough income for Pesach, must borrow money to give towards Maos Chitim, as the parameter of this mitzvah transcends standard tzedaka and relates to the mitzvah of Simchas Yom Tov.


3) The Gaon of Vilna zt”l found an allusion to the obligation of Maos Chitim in the following pasukim in Bo (13, 6-7). “For a seven day period shall you eat Matzos...Matzos shall be eaten for seven days.” The first pasuk refers to our personal obligation to eat matzos. The second refers to our obligation to ensure that others have the opportunity to eat matzos, too. The Gaon points out that the word matzah is written chaser (i.e. without a vav) in the first pasuk and maleh (i.e. with a vav) in the second. This indicates that the obligation to facilitate the eating of matzos by others is even greater than one’s personal obligation to eat matzah.


In the merit of this altruistic mitzvah, may we all have a Chag Kosher V’Sameach.